Bankruptcy: A Time Synthesis by Joslin, Stanley G.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 46
Issue 4 Spring 1963 Article 2
Bankruptcy: A Time Synthesis
Stanley G. Joslin
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Stanley G. Joslin, Bankruptcy: A Time Synthesis, 46 Marq. L. Rev. 405 (1963).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol46/iss4/2
BANKRUPTCY: A TIME SYNTHESIS
G. STANLEY JOSLIN*
To bring together the myriad time factors in the Bankruptcy Act
in to an integrated whole is the purpose herein. The time factors to
be considered are only those which express a definite number of days,
months or years within which rights in bankruptcy differ from those
which exist outside of the specifically designated period. Thus the
question involving the time of perfection of a preference, which must
be within four months of the petition,' will be considered, as will be
the fraudulent conveyance "one year" period,2 and the thirty day pro-
vision for paying the cash surrender value of a life insurance policy.3
Although many time factors in the Bankruptcy Act are as important
as those designated by day, month or year units, they are not intended
to be included in our present consideration. Therefore, numerous salient
time problems such as the time at which the trustee is vested with the
title to property of the bankrupt,4 and the time at which the right to
recover damages in any pending action for negligence becomes prov-
able5 are not to be included in as much as these have no time unit
designation. The scope of this present synthesis is further limited to
"straight bankruptcy" and will not go into the time elements in other
Chapters of the Bankruptcy Act.6
UNIT COMPUTATION
The designated time units used in the Bankruptcy Act are days7
months" and years.9 The method of computing days is carefully spelled
out in the Act itself in Section 31 where it is provided that the number
of days will be computed by excluding the first if including the last.
This section further specifies that if the last day falls on Sunday or
holiday, the last day will be the day after the Sunday or holiday which
is not a Sunday or holiday. 10 To determine what holidays may toll the
running of the time, Section 1 (18) defines a holiday by setting out
* Candler Professor of Law, Emory University, Atlanta, Ga. Member of the
United States Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules.
B.A., Cornell College. LL.B., Wisconsin. LL.M., Michigan. Inactive member
of the State Bar of Wisconsin.
'Bankruptcy Act §60(a) (1) & (2) ; 11 U.S.C: §96(a) (1) & (2) (1958).
2 Bankruptcy Act §67(d) (2) ; 11 U.S.C. §107(d) (2) (1958).
3Bankruptcy Act. §70(a) (5) 2nd proviso; 11 U.S.C. §110(a) (5) 2nd proviso
(1958).
4 Bankruptcy Act §70(a) ; 11 U.S.C. §110(a) (1958).
5 Bankruptcy Act §63(a) (7) ; 11 U.S.C. §103(a) (7) (1958).6 Bankruptcy Act Chapters I, II, III, IV, V, VI & VII (1958).
7 E.g., Bankruptcy Act §7(a) (8) ; 11 U.S.C. §25(a) (8) (1958).
s E.g., Bankruptcy Act §3 (b) ; 11 U.S.C. §213(b) (1958).
9 E.g., Bankruptcy Act §14(a) (5); 11 U.S.C. §32(a) (5) (1958).10 Bankruptcy Act §31; See In the Matter of Dorado Plastics Corporation, 184
F. Supp. 283 (D. Puerto Rico 1960).
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the well known holidays and then goes farther by including any day
named as a holiday or day of public fasting or thanksgiving by the
President or Congress, or by the Governor or Legislature of the State
in which the proceeding is filed." The computation of day units, then,
is clearly set out and should cause little trouble. This also applies to
time limits designated in the General Orders. 2 The computation of
time, designated by month or year units, is not spelled out in the Act
itself. However, the principle of excluding the first day and including
the last is applied. A month is not determined as having a set number
of days, but a period measured by months is simply computed as
running from date to date. Thus an event occurring on the first of
January is within the four-month period of a petition filed on the first
of May, and an event taking place on the first of July is within a year
of a petition filed on the first of the following July.Y
I. MAJOR TIME COMPUTATIONS
The major time computations, at least from the standpoint of
complicated involvement, are: 1. The requirement that a petition be
filed against a person within four months after the commission of an
act of bankruptcy ;14 2. The four months factor in determining a pre-
ference;'5 3. The four months time element in avoidance of judicial
liens ;16 and 4. The broad one year component of fraudulent convey-
ances."
11 Bankruptcy Act §1 (18) U.S.C. §1 (18) (1958).
122 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY, 531.02 (14th ed. 1956). Rule 6 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure was amended Jan. 21, 1963 to provide:
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed
by these rules, by the local rules of any district court, by order of court, or
by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which
the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last
day of the period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a
Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of
the next day which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When
the period of time prescribed or allowed is less than 7 days, intermediate
Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation.
As used in this rule . . ., "Legal holiday" includes New Year's Day, Washing-
ton's Birthday, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Veterans Day,
Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and any other day appointed as a holiday
by the President or the Congress of the United States, or by the state in
which the district court is held.(b) Enlargement. When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder
or by order of court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within
a specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion
(1) with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request
therefore is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed
or as extended by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after the
expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure
to act was the result of excusable neglect; . . . . See Bankruptcy Act Sec.
21(k) ; 11 U.S.C. P4(k) (1958).
13 See 2 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 531.02, p. 1303 (14th ed. 1956).
14 Bankruptcy Act §3(b) ; 11 U.S.C. §21 (b) (1958).
15 Bankruptcy Act §60(a); 11 U.S.C. §96(a) (1958).
16 Bankruptcy Act §67(a) ; 11 U.S.C. §107(a) (1958).
17 Bankruptcy Act §67(d); 11 U.S.C. §107(d) (1958).
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1. Time for Act of Bankruptcy
One of the necessary ingredients for an involuntary petition in
bankruptcy is that an act of bankruptcy must have been committed
within four months.18 The first act of bankruptcy is concealment of
property or a fraudulent conveyance. 19 However the four months does
not start to run on the fraudulent conveyance until the transfer is
perfected so that no bona fide purchaser from the debtor could ac-
quire rights in the property superior to the rights of the transferee. 20
This, of course, was designed to prevent secret transfers made before
the four months period from becoming effective by requiring some
semblance of notice to come to creditors before the time would begin to
run against him. A simple illustration of dating from time of per-
fection and not from the time of the transfer could be made by sup-
posing a deed executed and delivered to a wife on July 1st and re-
corded on September 1st. Between these dates the husband could
effectively deed the property to a bona fide purchaser, but after re-
cording on September 1st, he could not. The transfer would then be
perfected at the time of the recording of the deed and at that time
the four months period would begin to run. The many, well established
perfection dates for personal property transfers will be upset by the
Uniform Commercial Code as it sweeps the country and the older
treatment reanalyzed. For example, a fraudulent chattel mortgage on
farm equipment under the Uniform Commercial Code will be per-
fected only upon the filing of a financial statement in the proper office
in the county of the debtor's residence, or if not a resident of the
state, then in the county where the goods are kept.21 In states, then,
that have adopted the Uniform Commercial Code a new problem in
determining perfection dates has arisen. It has generally been accepted
that the concealment aspect of the first act of bankruptcy is not subject
to the bona fide purchaser test and that the four months limitation
begins to run on concealments only from thd time of discovery.2 2 The
second act of bankruptcy-the preference2 3--- is made within the gov-
erning four months period before the petition, if the transfer became
perfected within that time.2 4 To determine the time of perfection, a
different standard is designated for real and personal property. A
transfer of personal property is deemed to be made when so far per-
18 Bankruptcy Act §3(b) ; 11 U.S.C. §21(b) (1958).
19 Bankruptcy Act §3 (a) (1) ; 11 U.S.C. §21 (a) (1) (1958).
20 Bankruptcy Act §3(b) ; 11 U.S.C. §21(b) (1958).
21 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §9-302 and §9-401 (1958); see Hiller, The Uni-
form Commercial Code in the Bankruptcy Courts, 36 REF. J. 112 (1962);
Kennedy, The Impact of the Uniform Conmercial Code on Insolvency: 67
Com. L. J. 113, III, p. 117 (1962).
22 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY Jl2.702 (14th ed. 1956).
23 Bankruptcy Act §3 (a) (2) ; 11 U.S.C. §21(a) (2) (1958).
24 Bankruptcy Act 93 (b) ; 11 U.S.C. §21(b) (1958).
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fected as to be free from a lien by judicial process, 25 while a transfer
of real property is deemed to be made when perfected against bona
fide purchases from the debtor.26 Thus we see that the time for the
perfection of a fraudulent conveyance is the bona fide purchaser test
and that it is applied to both real and personal property, while the
test for perfecting a preference is the bona fide purchaser test for
real property and the judicial lien test for personal property.2 7
The third act of bankruptcy has three time elements. A judicial
lien must be obtained within four months of the petition 2 and such
lien must have continued for over thiry days or have have not been
vacated at least five days before the date set for sale. Although the
four months period begins to run at the time the judicial lien is ob-
tained, to justify involuntary proceedings, the lien must have con-
tinued over thiry days or have continued to within five days before
the sale date. 9
The fourth act of bankruptcy to be available for involuntary pro-
ceeding must also have occurred within four months of the petition.
To compute the time, the general assignment for creditors will be
considered made when the assignment is perfected as against a bona
fide purchaser. ° The fifth and sixth acts of bankruptcy have no time
computation problem other than that they must have occurred within
four months of the petition.31
In computing the time factors involved in determining whether
an act of bankruptcy has occurred within four months of the petition,
the initial traniaction in many instances does not start the time period
running but later actions will start the count. The two determinative
tests are either the bona fide purchaser test or the judicial lien test.
These may be applied to both real or personal property or to one or
the other. To recognize these differences makes charting a time problem
through the various acts of bankruptcy a relatively simple matter.
Most time computation problems are affected by amendments to
the document tolling the running of time. With our present problem
it seems there has been a tendency to permit petitions filed within the
four months period to be implemented by amendments after the four
months limitation and thus to keep within the time within which an
25 Bankruptcy Act §60(a) (2) ; 11 U.S.C. §96(a) (7) (1958).
26 Ibid.
27 Other time elements involved in preferences under §60 will be considered
later herein.
28 Bankruptcy Act §3(b) ; 11 U.S.C. 921(b) (1958).
29 Bankruptcy Act §3(a) (3); 11 U.S.C. 921(a) (3) (1958). For a discussion of
filing periods for Acts of Bankruptcy, see 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTcY 53.702
through 53.707 (14th ed. 1956). A more detailed consideration of the 30 day,
and 5 day element of this Act of Bankruptcy will be considered hereafter
under "Time for vacating Judicial liens to avoid an act of Bankruptcy."
30 Bankruptcy Act §3(b) ; 11 U.S.C. §21(b) (1958).
31 Ibid.
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act of bankruptcy may be available for an involuntary proceeding,
as the amendment will normally relate back to the time of the original
petition.32 However, if an amendment is permitted setting for a new
act of bankruptcy, it will normally date from the time of the amend-
ment unless the bankrupt consented to such addition. 33
2. Time Computations Involved in Determining Preferences
The basic time computations involved in determining whether a
preference has been made are the same as those considered in con-
nection with the time within which a preference may be available as
an act of bankruptcy for an involuntary petition. This has been con-
sidered in subsection 1 supra, and may be briefly restated as designating
the time of transfer for personal property as determined by the judicial
lien test and a transfer of real property by the bona fide purchaser
test. However, there are other time elements of importance in deter-
mining preference matters. A preference must be a transfer within
four months of the petition and all elements of a preference must have
existed as of the time of the perfected transfer,34 except the greater
percentage element which will be determined as of the time of the
bankruptcy.35 However, the time computation in connection with pre-
ferences is complicated by the permissive relation back period of 21
days provided for in the Act. This provides, in determining a prefer-
ence, that a transfer on account of a new and contemporaneous con-
sideration which by applicable law may be perfected within twenty-one
days or less, shall be deemed to be made at the time of the original
transfer.36 This, simply stated, recognizes state laws providing for a
relation back period for recording of transfers at least if not over
twenty-one days. Wisconsin has a ten day relation back period for
conditional sales, 37 while Georgia has a thirty day relation back period.
38
Wisconsin's relation back period then will be fully recognized in pre-
ference time computations while that of Georgia's will only be recog-
nized not to exceed twenty-one days. To give more meaning to the
permissive twenty-one day relation back period of the bankruptcy act,
32 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 518.23 (14th ed. 1956). Gen. Orders In Bankruptcy 11.
33 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 51826 (14th ed. 1956).
34 Bankruptcy Act §60(a) (1) & (2) ; 11 U.S.C. §96(a) (1) & (2) (1958).
353 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 560.36 (14th ed. 1956).
36 Bankruptcy Act §60(a) (7) ; U.S.C. §96(a) (7) (1958).37Every provision in a conditional sale is void as to purchasers or levying credi-
tors before the contract is filed unless filed within ten days. Wis. STAT.
122.05 (1957).
38 Any conditional sale when filed or recorded within thirty days, has priority
from the date of its execution. 20 GA. CODE ANN. 67-1403. This will be super-
seded by the Uniform Commercial Code scheduled to become effective in
Georgia on April 1, 1963. Ga. Laws (Reg. Session 1962) 109 A-10-101, p.
426. The U.C.C. integrates well with the bankruptcy's preference relation
back period. The longest period permitted under the Uniform Commercial
Code is 21 days. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §9-304(4), (5) & (6) ; for
10 days see UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §9-301(2) and §9-306(3).
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hypotheticals may be helpful. Under a state law permitting the filing
of a conditional sale within ten days to be effective as of the date of
its execution, a preferencial transfer would not take place within four
months of a petition filed November 5th if a conditional sale were
executed on July 1st and recorded on July 9th. However, under a
state law permitting a thirty day relation back period, a preferential
transfer would be within four months of a petition filed on July 1st if
a conditional sales contract were executed February 12th and recorded
March 8th. Yet under the same thirty day state statute, a transfer would
not be within the four months period of a petition filed on July 1st
if executed February 16th and recorded March 4th. The act permits
not over a twenty-one day relation back period but gives effect to that
period where the state law, for its local purposes, provides a longer
period of time.3 9 The scope of the permissive relation back period is
more limited than might first be noticed. It applies only to transfers
for new and contemporaneous consideration. 40 Without this recogni-
tion, the time for computing preferences would run from the time of
recording for the transfer would be deemed made at that time and thus
be made on account of an antecedent debt, as the debt continues its
original date.41
3. Time Computations in Determining Fraudluent Conveyances
Although a transfer which is a fraudulent conveyance under any
State or Federal law is voidable by the trustee in bankruptcy if the
right is not barred by a statute of limitations,42 the Bankruptcy Act
itself designates certain transactions which will be deemed fraudulent
conveyances if made within certain designated periods before the filing
of the petition in Bankruptcy. Thus we see that certain transfers made
or obligations incurred within one year of the petition are voidable by
the trustee irrespective of any other State or Federal law.43 A one year
limitation is also placed on certain transactions by partnerships which
are designated as fraudulent transfers" and a more restrictive time
period of four months for certain transfers made in contemplation of
bankruptcy proceedings. 45 The important thing to note here is that the
time factor is an essential element in the trustee's right to avoid. The
only transfers to which this part of the Act applies are those made
within one year, or within four months of the petition.46 Although
39 Bankruptcy Act §60(a) (7) I; 11 U.S.C. §96(a) (7) (1958).
40 Bankruptcy Act §60(a) (7) ; 11 U.S.C. §96(a) (7) (1958).
41 See 3 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY 560.39 (14th ed. 1956) ; see also In re Burton, 120
F. Supp. 148 (D. Maryland 1954).
42 Bankruptcy Act §70(e) ; 11 U.S.C. §110(e) (1958).
43Bankruptcy Act §67(d)(2); 11 U.S.C. §107(d)(2) (1958). See Rader v.
Lichtenthal, 306 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1962).
44 Bankruptcy Act §67(d) (4); 11 U.S.C. §107(d) (4) (1958).
45 Bankruptcy Act §67(d) (3); 11 U.S.C. §107(d) (3) (1958).
46 See footnotes 43, 44, and 45 supra.
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all other elements of the fraudulent conveyance are therein set out,
they would not be voidable by the trustee unless the transfer took
place within the applicable restricted period before the petition.
The test for determining when a transfer is deemed to have been
made for these specially created fraudulent conveyances must be
noted because of its variance from other tests used in the Bank-
ruptcy Act. As had been said supra, the test for determining when
transfers are deemed to have been made for real estate and personal
property differ.47 However, the time computations here are based on the
bona fide purchaser test applied to both real and personal property.
Thus for these specially created fraudulent conveyances the transfers
are deemed to have been made at the time when it became so far per-
fected that a bona fide purchaser could not acquire rights superior to
the rights of the transferee. 48 A deed of land, or mortgage of personal
property executed on December 10th and recorded on January 3rd,
would under the laws of most states relative to bona fide purchasers,
be within a year of a petition filed on the following January 2nd.
II. MINOR TIME COMPUTATIONS
Thus far the more basic and complicated time elements as they
are involved in Acts of Bankruptcy, Preferences and Fraudulent Con-
veyances have been considered. This Section II will consider im-
portant but less troublesome time elements as they appear in myriad
places in the Bankruptcy Act.
1. Proper Venue
Although the authority of the bankruptcy courts to entertain a
bankruptcy petition is very broad,49 the Act concisely designates the
proper venue and this involves a time computation. The test is based
upon a principal place of business residence, or domicile within the
territorial jurisdiction for the preceding six months, or for a longer
portion of the preceding six months than in any other jurisdiction.r0
In most situations then, the principal place of business, domicile, or
residence for the preceding six months determines the place where a
petition should be filed. However, the computations for the more
transient debtor may be more complicated. In this regard it should
be noted that the computation, where the debtor has not established
himself in one jurisdiction for at least six months preceding the peti-
tion, is to determine in which jurisdiction the debtor resided or had
his principal place of business longer than in any other jurisdiction
during the last preceding six months. There is no requirement that
the contact with the jurisdiction be more than half the six months
-1 See footnote 18 and text supra.
48 Bankruptcy Act §67(d) (5) ; 11 U.S.C. §107 (d) (5) (1958).4 9 Bankruptcy Act .32(b) & (c) ; 11 U.S.C. §55(b) & (c) (1958).
50 Bankruptcy Act §2(a) (1) ; 11 U.S.C. §11(a) (1) (1958).
1963]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
time, but only the establishing that the selected jurisdiction had the
contact for the longest period. Thus it is possible that one who has
lived in the jurisdiction only a very short time could properly invoke
it, and under a similar provision it was held that only one day in the
district was sufficient if a person had not resided in any other district
a longer period of time during the last six months.5 Where one has
moved many times in the preceding six months, the establishing of
the longest period of required contact to jusitfy the proper venue may
be a troublesome one, but it is suggested in such a case the petition
be filed in any district where the debtor has had a contact and is most
convenient to the instigator of the proceedings with the hope that the
Judge may permit the proceedings to continue there, as he well may.52
2. Time for Vacating Judicial Lien
To avoid an Act of Bankruptcy, as has been noted under "Major
Time Computations" above,53 the time for filing an involuntary petition
based on a judicial lien expires four months after the date of the
lien.54 However, the debtor who has suffered such judicial lien or
distraint may prevent its ripening into an act of bankruptcy and thus
shut off any involuntary petition in bankruptcy on this ground by
vacating the lien within thirty days after its date, or at least five days
before the date set for sale. It will be seen that these two time elements
act together. The five day period comes into play within thirty days
of the lien to permit an involunary petition after the thirty days even
though no date for sale is made.55 The debtor then, to avoid an act
of bankruptcy based on the judicial lien, must vacate the lien within
thirty days from its date if no date for sale is set, but if a date for
sale is set which will be before the thirty days, he must vacate it at
least five days before the sale. Thus it may be seen that a judicial lien
obtained on July 1st with the date set for sale on July 6th would
require the debtor to immediately have the lien vacated or an act of
bankruptcy would be irretrievably consumated.
3. Time Computations in re Actions (Statutes of Limitations)
As a general thing, pending suits upon a claim from which a dis-
charge would be a release will be stayed until adjudication and later
determination of discharge.5 6 However, a creditor may require the
51 See COLLIER BANKRUPTCY 52.13 (14th ed. 1956).
52 Bankruptcy Act §32(b) ; 11 U.S.C. §55(b) (1958).
5 See footnote 29 supra. Statutory liens may be valid even though arising within
four months of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy Act §67(b); 11 U.S.C. §107(b)(1958). A judicial declaration of a mechanic's lien within four months of
the petition does not impair the lien. Pittsburg Plate Glass v. Forbes, 128
S.E.2d 875 (1963).
54 Bankruptcy Act §§3(a) (3) & 3(b) ; 11 U.S.C. §§21 (a) (3) & 21(b) (1958).
55 See 1 CoLLiER, BANKRUPTCY 3.310 (14th ed. 1956).
5c Bankruptcy Act §11(a); 11 U.S.C. §29(a) (1958).
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vacating of such stay so that he may proceed with his suit during the
bankruptcy proceeding upon a showing that a proceeding under the
Act was commenced within six years of the present petition and the
debtor was granted a discharge or has had a composition confirmed
in that proceeding.57 The two elements to observe are the commence-
ment of the former proceedings and the results of the proceeding.
The time computation, however, runs from the commencement of
the previous proceeding to the date of the present petition, and that
presents little difficulty.
To prevent statutes of limitations from barring claims of the
debtor which have passed to the trustee, the bankruptcy act extends
the time within which the trustee may institute proceedings. Thus
any claim which the debtor had at the time of the petition and which
was not barred by a statute of limitation at that time, may be enforced
by the trustee within two years after the adjudication. The time compu-
tation here is from the time of adjudication to the time of the institu-
tion of the proceedings and such must be within two years.,5 However,
one must keep in mind that this two year period is used only to
extend a period of limitations and not to shorten those provided by
Federal or State law.59 Thus a state law providing a six year period
of limitations which started to run on January 2, 1960 will not be
barred until January 2, 1966, although an adjudication in bankruptcy
was made January 2, 1962.
The time within which certain acts, as distinct from claims, must
be done is also extended by the bankruptcy act.60 Thus where by con-
tract the debtor was to give a notice within a certain number of days,
or where by applicable law, outside of bankruptcy, an act was required
to be done within a designated time and that period had not expired
before the filing of the petition, the time within which the trustee may
do the required act is extended to sixty days.6 ' Here again the time
element is computed from the date of adjudication not the date of the
petition and the sixty day period only extends the time within which
an act may be done, but never shortens a longer permissive time. A
common example is the short period of time within which notice of
loss, etc., provided in insurance policies, must be given. If the time
has not expired when the petition is filed, the trustee has sixty days
5,Bankruptcy Act §11 (a) proviso; 11 U.S.C. §29(a) proviso (1958).
58 Bankruptcy Act §11 (e) ; 11 U.S.C. §29(e) (1958).
59 Ibid. The two year period does not start to run until the time the fraud
reasonably should have been discovered, Hooper v. Mountain States Securities
Corporation, 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960). For the effect of this Section 11 (e)
on a State statute limiting the time an action may be brought to avoid a
preference, see In re Scott-Fredrick Motor Co., 177 F. Supp. 758 (E.D. Ky.
1959).
60 Bankruptcy Act §11(e) ; 11 U.S.C. §29 (e) (1958).
61 Ibid.
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after adjudication within which to comply with the insurance agree-
ment, even though the time otherwise would have expired shortly
after the petition.6
2
Not only are the rights of a debtor in bankruptcy existing at the
time of the petition, protected from being barred by a statute of
limitations until a reasonable time for the trustee to assert them, but
claims against the bankrupt debtor are also preserved from the run-
ning of statutes of limitations for designated periods.
The Act provides that the operation of any statute of limitations
affecting provable claims against the bankrupt is suspended for a
designated period of time after the filing of the petition.63 It should
be noted here that the time computation begins with the filing of the
petition, and not (as in the case of claims held by the bankrupt) from
the time of adjudication. The computation ends with one of four
points of time, depending upon the situation. Thus any statute of
limitations is suspended: 1. From the date of the filing of the petition
until the expiration of thirty days after the entry of an order denying
discharge of such order is made ;G4 2. From the petition until the
expiration of thirty days after the filing of a waiver of the right to
discharge;65 3. From the petition until thirty days after the loss of
the right to discharge if lost ;6 4. From the petition until thirty days
after -,:he dismissal of the bankruptcy proceedings if dismissed, or
whichever may first occur ;87 5. And from the petition until thirty days
after rhe time for a corporation to apply for discharge when no
application is made.68 This requires a dual type computation, as the
time within a corporation must apply for a discharge is within six
months after adjudication. It might be said then that a statute of
limitations affecting claims against a corporation which has not applied
for a discharge are suspended for a period of six months after ad-
judication plus thirty days.
It is important to note in regard to the computation of time in
case of dismissal of the bankruptcy proceedings, that the thirty day
suspension of the statutes of limitations may be shortened if one of
the other suspension periods has already passed, or will be ended
within the thirty days after the dismissal. It should further be noted
62 See 1 CoLLIER BANKRUPrCY 511.13 (1956).
63 Bankruptcy Act §11(f) ; 11 U.S.C. §29(f) (1958) ; The filing of a petition in
bankruptcy does not suspend the requirement that statutory liens be perfected
according to the requirements of state law. Munson v. Resinger, 114 So.2d
59 (1959).
64 Bankruptcy Act §11(f) (1); 11 U.S.C. §29(f) (1) (1958).
65 Bankruptcy Act §11(f) (2); 11 U.S.C. §29(f) (2) (1958).
66 Ibid.
67 Bankruptcy Act §11(f) (3) ; 11 U.S.C. §29(f) (3) (1958).
68 Bankruptcy Act §§11 (f) (2) and 14(a); 11 U.S.C. §§29(f) (2) and 32(a)
(1958).
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that these suspension provisions affect statutes of limitations only as
to provable debts.69
In passing, a statute of limitations protecting receivers and trustees
from belated harassment may be noted. The Act provides that any suit
brought upon any matter in connection with the administration of a
receiver or trustee, must be brought within two years after the estate
has been formally and finally closed.7 0 It follows that if an estate is
reopened, suits may be brought against the trustee, although more than
two years have elapsed since the first closing if not subsequent to two
years after the final closing.71 The time within which proceedings upon
receiver's or trustee's bonds is also limited. The Act provides that
such proceedings shall not be brought subsequent to two years after
their discharge.7 2 Note here that the time element is computed from
date of the receiver's, or trustee's discharge, not the closing of the
estate.
4. Time Factors Involved in Discharge Proceedings
Although the adjudication of a person automatically operates as
an application for a discharge, a corporation must file an application
for the privilege within six months after adjudication.7 3 The time set
for filing objections to discharge may be somewhat complicated,
especially where filing fees are permitted to be paid in installments,
as no time for filing objections to discharge may be set until all filing
fees are paid.7 4 The court may give the bankrupt nine months to pay
the filing fees," and if that is the case, the order fixing the time for
filing objections to discharge may not issue until that time. In any
event, the court must fix a time for filing objections to the bankrupt's
discharge not less than thirty days after the date set for the first
creditor's meeting.76 Notice of the order must be given by mail at
least thirty days before the last day fixed for the filing of the objec-
tion 7 7 thus in all probability the order determining the last day for
filing objections should be sufficiently over thirty days to reasonably
enable the notice to be effectively given. If objections are filed
necessitating a hearing, a thirty day notice by mail of the time and
place of the hearing is required. Although these time periods seem
69 Bankruptcy Act §11(f) ; 11 U.S.C. §29(f) (1958).
70Bankruptcy Act §§l1(d) and 2(a)(8); 11 U.S.C. §§29(d) and 11(a)(8)
(1958).
71 See 1 COLLrm, BANKRUPTCY 511.13 (14th ed. 1956).
72 Bankruptcy Act §50(m) ; 11 U.S.C. §78(m) (1958).
73 Bankruptcy Act §14(a); 11 U.S.C. §32(a) (1958).
74Bankruptcy Act §14(b); 11 U.S.C. §32(b) (1958); Gen. Orders in Bank-
ruptcy 35 (4) (c).
75 Gen. Order in Bankruptcy 35(4) (a) (1961). This G. 0. in all probability will
be slightly changed in the near future.
76 Bankruptcy Act §14(b) 11 U.S.C. §32(b) (1958).
77 Bankruptcy Act §58(b); 11 U.S.C. §94(b) (1958).
78 Bankruptcy Act §58(b) (3) ; 11 U.S.C. §94(b) (3) (1958).
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arbitrary, there is the usual after-thought softness evidenced by rou-
tine authority for extension of the time for filing such objections.7 9
Not only must the objection be filed, but in addition a specification in
writing stating the grounds of opposition and this also must be filed
on or before the time set for filing of objection to discharge.80
Certain of the bars to a general discharge in bankruptcy have time
elements within them. Thus it is noted that a fraudulent conveyance
made subsequent to the first day of the twelve months preceding the
filing of the petition is a grounds for refusing discharge. It has been
suggested that a twelve month period and a one year period are the
same, but that one might illogically argue that the phrase "the first
day" meant the first day of the month, thus extending the time. The
better interpretation is to hold "the first day" to mean the day arrived
at from counting back twelve months even though that day be some
other than the first of that month."' The most popular time limitation
in bankruptcy, of course, is the prohibition against more than one dis-
charge within a designated period. It should be noted in passing that
the time period runs from the commencement of a prior proceeding
to the filing of the petition in the present proceeding. Thus it is possible
to get two discharges within six years. The prior proceedings must
have provided a discharge, or the confirmation of a composition to be
the basis for the six year limitation. A later discharge will not be
granted then, where a discharge has been granted in a proceeding
commenced six years prior to the filing of the petition in the instant
bankruptcy proceeding. 82 The advantage of the time limitation, however,
may be lost if the grounds for the refusal is not raised or does not
come to the attention of the court and a second discharge is given. 83
5. Time Computations In Determining The
Property Rights of The Trustee
One of the most basic points of time upon which rights in bank-
ruptcy are fixed, is the date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy,
and virtually all property of the bankrupt as of that time vests in
the trustee.84 However, it may be surprising to a newcomer to bank-
ruptcy to find that certain properties may come into existence or
change form after the petition and within a designated period and be
gathered into the distributable assets of the estate. Thus it is seen that
many interests in real property which were not subject to be taken
from the bankrupt at the time of the petition, may be taken by the
trustee if they become assignable within six months after the filing
19 Bankruptcy Act §14(b) ; 11 U.S.C. §32(b) (1958).
80 General Order In Bankruptcy 32 (1961).
sl See 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 514.46, footnote 8 (14th ed. 1956).
82 Bankruptcy Act §14(c) (5) ; 11 U.S.C. §32(c) (5) (1958).
83 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 514.53 (14th ed. 1956).
84 Bankruptcy Act §70(a) ; 11 U.S.C. §110(a) (1958).
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of the petition. Contingent remainders, rights of reverter and executory
devises are examples of these interests . 5 Furthermore all non-exempt
property which comes to the bankrupt by bequest, devise or inheri-
tance within six months after the petition, passes to the trustee to be
administered in the bankrupt's estate.86 Non-exempt property held by
the entirety, which would not pass to the trustee as of the date of the
petition, will also pass to him if it become transferable solely by the
bankrupt within six months of the petition. 7
The cash surrender value of non-exempt life insurance payable
to the bankrupt, who is a natural person, his estate or personal rep-
resentative, passes to the trustee if the bankrupt does not pay to the
trustee the surrender value within thirty days after the cash surrender
value has been ascertained and stated to the trustee. Or putting it
the other way, a bankrupt has that thirty days to pay the surrender
value to keep the policy clear from participating creditors.8 The
events which start the thirty day period running here are unique. These
are, "after the cash surrender value has been ascertained and stated
to the trustee by the company." 89 It seems that starting the thirty day
period running after the ascertained value is stated to the trustee and
the bankrupt is given notice of its value and his rights of payment
would be fairer. This would remove the possible element of loss of
rights of a bankrupt through ignorance of them and certainly good
practice requires the trustee to notify the bankrupt of this thirty day
privilege.
The trustee should within thirty days after his appointment and
qualification decide whether he will prosecute an application for a
patent, copyright, or trademark submitted by the bankrupt and notify
the applicant of his decision. If this notice is not given, the applicant
within the thirty days may apply for an order revesting the title in
the bankrupt and this will be granted unless the time for the trustee
to make his decision is extended.90 It should be noted here that the
time period runs from the appointment and qualification of the trustee,
not the date of the petition.
The trustee is required to assume or reject executory contracts
within sixty days after adjudication or within thirty days after the
qualification of the trustee, but if a trustee is not appointed the execu-
tory contract will be deemed rejected within thirty days after the
85 Bankruptcy Act §70(a) (7) ; 11 U.S.C. §110(a) (7) (1958).
86 Bankruptcy Act §70 (a) 1st unlettered par. and §1(13). 11 U.S.C. §110(a) 1st
unlettered par. and §1 (13) (1958).87Bankruptcy Act §70(a) 2nd unlettered par.; 11 U.S.C. §110(a) 2nd unlettered
par. (1958).88 Bankruptcy Act §70(a) (5) 2nd proviso; 11 U.S.C. §110(a) (5) 2nd proviso
(1958).
89 Ibid.
90 Bankruptcy Act §70(a) (2); 11 U.S.C. §110(a) (2) (1958).
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order directing that a trustee not be appointed. The trustee is further
required file a statement of contracts which are executory, within sixty
days after adjudication or within thirty days after qualification. These
time requirements, however, as usual are softened by permissive ex-
tensions.9 ' The time period here runs from adjudication, even though
a trustee has not been appointed or qualified. This may require a
trustee to immediately ask for an extension of time where his appoint-
ment is made belatedly after the adjudication, especially where the
proceeding is a voluntary one and adjudication is automatic with the
filing of the petition. 92
Thus far those time computations classed as major and those
classed as minor have been considered in a detailed way consistent
with their importance and intricate involvement. There are a myriad
of other time factors which although important in determining rights,
are uncomplicated in their application and which will be presented
hereunder very briefly to round out a complete synthesis of this
problem. The chief value of this further itemization of time factors
in bankruptcy will be to make available a quick reference to prevent
an unfortunate oversight by those involved in bankruptcy proceedings.
Time factors primarily applicable to routine duties of referees and
clerks will not be considered. It is in this area that rights and remedies
may be governed by the rules of civil procedure. It is, therefore,
important to keep in mind that where these rules do apply any time
limitation therein may be shortened by the court to expedite hearings.93
III. INCIDENTAL TIME FACTORS
The trustee is required to furnish a performance bond within five
days after his appointment. This time may be extended, not to exceed
five days, by the court. If the trustee, however, expects to perform
official duties the five day period, he must furnish the bond before he
enters upon them,94 and a certified copy of the order approving the
bond should be recorded in the proper office in each county where the
bankrupt owns real estate, within ten days after his qualification. 95
Within five days after receiving notice of his appointment, the trustee
should report exempt property set off to the bankrupt but this time
may be extended by the court. 9 If this report is not filed within five
days after it is due, the trustee may be removed from office upon a
"show cause" served upon him at least three days before the hearing.9
93Bankruptcy Act §70(b), as amended by Pub. L. No. 87-681, 76 Stat. 570, Sept.
25, 1962.
92 Bankruptcy Act §18(f); 11 U.S.C. §41 (f) (1958).
93 Bankruptcy Act §21 (k); General Order in Bankruptcy 37.
94 Bankruptcy Act §50(b); 11 U.S.C. §78(b) (1958).
95 Bankruptcy Act §47(c); 11 U.S.C. §75(c) (1958).
96 General Order in Bankruptcy 17 (2) (1961).
97 General Order in Bankruptcy 17 (3) (1961).
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The law applicable in determining exemptions is the state of domicile
for the six months preceding the filing of the petition or a longer por-
tion of such period than in any other state.98 Reports should be filed
with the court within the first month after appointment and every two
months thereafter, but these requirements may be altered by order of
the court. 9 Dividends should be paid within ten days after they are
declared, 00 and final accounts filed fifteen days before the final meeting
of creditors. 101
The trustee should examine all liens obtained by attachment, judg-
ment, levy or other legal or equitable process within four months before
the petition in bankruptcy to determine whether they are voidable.
10 2
He may be somewhat surprised to find that receivers of trustee ap-
pointed outside of bankruptcy, assignees for the benefit of creditors
and agents appointed to take possession or liquidate a person's property
are not required to deliver property to the trustee in bankruptcy or
account to the court for its disposition if the receiver or trustee was
appointed, the assignment made or agent authorized more than four
months prior to bankruptcy' 0 3
2. Of Special Interest to Creditors
The involuntary petition must be served at least five days prior
to return day, and return day must be within ten days. These periods,
however, may be extended for cause shown.2° 4 The first meeting of
creditors should be held not less than ten nor more than thirty days
after the adjudication or as soon thereafter as possible. 0 5 Creditors
may request and the court must call a meeting within thirty days after
the filing of the request. 1 6 The creditors are obliged to file a list of
creditors within five days after the date of adjudication in cases of
involuntary bankruptcy when the bankrupt is absent or cannot be found.
Here again the court may extend this time.'0 7 At least a ten day notice
of matters of importance to the creditors must be given them. However,
property may be sold without notice upon cause shown the court,10 8
and not notice of dismissal for failure to pay costs need be given
creditors. 0 9 Objections may be made to the trustee's determination of
exemptions within ten days after the filing of the report of exempt
98 Bankruptcy Act §6; 11 U.S.C. §24 (1958).
99 Bankruptcy Act §47(a) (12) ; 11 U.S.C. §75(a) (12 (1958).
100 Bankruptcy Act §47(a) (11); 11 U.S.C. §75(a) (11) (1958).
101 Bankruptcy Act §47(a) (13) ; 11 U.S.C. §75(a) (13) (1958).
102 Bankruptcy Act §67(a) (1); 11 U.S.C. §107(a) (1) (1958).
103 Bankruptcy Act §2(a) (21) ; 11 U.S.C. §2(a) (21) (1958).
104 Bankruptcy Act §18(a) ; 11 U.S.C. §41(a) (1958).
105 Bankruptcy Act §55 (a); 11 U.S.C. §91(a) (1958).
1o Bankruptcy Act §55(d) ; 11 U.S.C. §91 (d) (1958).
'1o General Order in Bankruptcy 9 (1961).
108 Bankruptcy Act §58(a); 11 U.S.C. §94(a) (1958).
109 Bankruptcy Act §59(g); 11 U.S.C. §95(g) (1958).
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property and the time may be extended by the court.110 Bail may be
required for the appearance of the bankrupt, but not exceeding ten
days.11
There are a great number of time periods of interest to creditors
in regard to their claims. Their claims must be filed within six months
after the first date set for the first meeting of creditors, to be allowed.
However, the court may extend the time, if application is made before
the six months period has expired, for the United States, a State or
State subdivision. Claims of infants and insane persons may be ex-
tended six months longer and claims arising in favor of another by
reason of certain recoveries or avoidances by the trustee may be filed
within thirty days from the date of the avoidance or recovery. How-
ever, a claim by one who refused to pay money or deliver property to
the trustee pursuant to a final judgment within thirty days from such
judgment will not be allowed. 1 2 Certain claims have time period factors
incident to their determination. Thus claims of a landlord resulting
from rejection of a lease on real estate are allowed only to amount of
the rent for the year succeeding the surrender or re-entry of the
landlord plus accrued rent up to that surrender or re-entry.'1 3 Then,
too, claims for wages not to exceed $600 earned withit, three months
before the petition have a priority in payment" 4 and a landlord has
priority for rent which accrued within three months of the petition
in bankruptcy." 5 The use of assigned claims is restricted by the pro-
vision that a set-off or counter claim purchased by or transferred to
a creditor within four months before the petition in bankruptcy will
not be allowed if received for such use and with knowledge that the
transferor was insolvent or had committed an act of bankruptcy."16
The assignor of a claim assigned after the petition has been filed must
make any objection that he may have within ten days after notice is
given him by the referee subject, however, to an extension of time
made by the referee."1
7
Certain time computations involve the declaration and payment
of dividends. Thus creditors will note that the first dividend should
be declared within thirty days after the first date set for the first
110 General Order in Bankruptcy 17 (2) (1961).
1' Bankruptcy Act §10(a); 11 U.S.C. §28(a) (1958).
112 Bankruptcy Act §57(n) ; 11 U.S.C. §93(n) (1958). If a national holiday falls
on Sunday and thus is observed on Monday, Monday becomes a holiday. In
time computations the next day which is not a Sunday or a holiday would
be a Tuesday which would be included in the time computation. In Re
Dorado Plastics Corporation, 184 F. Supp. 283 (D. Puerto Rico, 1960).
113 Bankruptcy Act §63 (a) (9) 1st proviso; 11 U.S.C. §103 (a) (9) 1st proviso
(1958).
114 Bankruptcy Act §64(a) (2) ; 11 U.S.C. §104(a) (2) (1958).
115 Bankruptcy Act §64(a) (5) proviso; 11 U.S.C. §104(a) (5) proviso (1958).
116 Bankruptcy Act §68(b) ; 11 U.S.C. §108(b) (1958).
"7 General Order in Bankruptcy 21 (3) (1961).
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meeting of creditors. Certain restrictions are placed upon payment of
dividends until six months have expired since the first date set for
the first meeting, and the final dividend must not be declared until
three months after the declaration of the first dividend. However, if
no dividends are declared for over six months after the first date set
for the first meeting of creditors, only one dividend need be declared. 118
Dividends or other monies not claimed for sixty days after the final
dividend is declared and distributed will be deposited and shall not
be subject to escheat laws of any state.119
3. Of Special Interest to the Bankrupt
The bankrupt should answer the involuntary petition within five
days after the return day, but the time may be extended. 120 Under
certain circumstance the court may permit payment of fees in install-
ments. The final installment must be payable not more than six months
after the petition in bankruptcy. The time for the payment of any
installment, however, may be extended by the court, but not to exceed
three months. The total time for payment of fees then may be nine
months.12 1 A statement of affairs should be filed by the bankrupt at
least five days prior to the first meeting of creditors ;122 his claim for
exemptions should be filed within five days after adjudication ;123 and
a demand for a jury trial if desired should be made within five days
after the return day.124 These last three periods, however, are softened
by a permissive extension, as are so many of the time periods in the Act.
4. Time Periods in Appeals
A petition for review of a referee's order should be filed within
ten days after its entry, but this time may be extended if requested by
a petition filed within the ten day period.
1 25
Appeals to the United States Courts of Appeal must be taken
within thirty days after written notice to the aggrieved party. If no
such notice is served and filed, the appeal may be taken within forty
days from the entry of judgment. Proof of notice where given must
be filed within five days after service. It will be noted that the maxi-
mum time for appeal is forty days from the judgment or order.2 1
This concludes the bringing together of all time periods within,
before, or after which certain rights exist or actions must be taken.
118 Bankruptcy Act §65 (b); 11 U.S.C. §105 (b) (1958).
119 Bankruptcy Act §66(a); 11 U.S.C. §106(a) (1958).
12o Bankruptcy Act §18(b); 11 U.S.C. §41(b) (1958).
121 General Order in Bankruptcy 35 (4) (a) (1961).
122Bankruptcy Act §7(a) (8) ; 11 U.S.C. §25 (a) (8) (1958).
123 Ibid.
124 Bankruptcy Act §19; 11 U.S.C. §42 (1958).
125 Bankruptcy Act §39(c); 11 U.S.C. §67 (1958), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §67
(Supp. III, 1962).126Bankruptcy Act §25(a); 11 U.S.C. W48(a); See 2 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY
525.04.
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Only those periods applicable to proceedings in straight bankruptcy
have synthesized. A very few periods, of interest only to the court
or some administrative officer, have been omitted from consideration,'
2 7
but these are few and insignificant. Time factors with only one point,
such as "the date of the petition," were not considered. Only those
having two points, as "4 months after the petition" were synthesized.
Time factors involved in the one point type, justify a separate catena-
tion and were not within the scope of the present article. One word
of warning in closing to the novice in bankruptcy practice. Be sure
to note the point from which the time is calculated. It may be five
days from: the petition, the adjudication, the first meeting of creditors
or any other of many starting points.
127E.g., see Bankruptcy Act §§34 & 40(a) & (b) ; 11 U.S.C. §§62 and 68(a) & (b)
(1958). See also General Order in Bankruptcy 53 (3) (7) & (10) (1961).
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